Electoral incentives and distributive politics in young democracies: Evidence from Chile
- Autor(en)
- Felipe Livert
- Abstrakt
How do electoral incentives and institutional constraints vary as democracies consolidate? Are incumbents more inclined to behave opportunistically during transitions, or when the rules of the game are well established? Using Chile as a case study and exploiting panel data on public works investment at the municipal level, the article examines if the strategies to obtain electoral rewards have changed over time. From the first democratic elections and until the constitutional reforms of 2005, those municipalities where the coalition government won in national and local elections were systematically privileged before municipal polls. After the reforms, we find no sign of partisan preference but investment kept on rising during ballot years, indicative of the persistence of political budget cycles. Indeed, we identify stronger cycles as democracy was consolidated. The article concludes discussing the role played by institutional constraints and incentives shaping distributive politics.
- Organisation(en)
- Institut für Geographie und Regionalforschung
- Journal
- Electoral Studies
- Band
- 73
- ISSN
- 0261-3794
- DOI
- https://doi.org/10.1016/j.electstud.2021.102377
- Publikationsdatum
- 10-2021
- Peer-reviewed
- Ja
- ÖFOS 2012
- 507015 Regionalforschung, 502027 Politische Ökonomie
- Schlagwörter
- ASJC Scopus Sachgebiete
- Political Science and International Relations
- Link zum Portal
- https://ucrisportal.univie.ac.at/de/publications/d7248bca-6e2c-4f6c-a9fe-c60a709741a4