Distributive politics and decentralisation in Chile and Peru

Author(s): Felipe Bernabé Livert Aquino
Abstract: The paper presents evidence that decentralisation increases partisan inﬂuence in the allocation of nonprogrammatic resources. The model employs a panel data and ﬁxed eﬀects analysis using data corresponding to intergovernmental transfers from the national level, passing through the regional level and earmarked for investment for local governments in Chile (2008-2018) and Peru (2004 - 2013). The results indicate political inﬂuence on the distribution of resources. The distribution of resources is used tactically in both countries in presidential election years. The implementation of laws increasing political decentralisation in Chile and Peru increased the political bias in resource distribution. The results have policy implications and provide a comparative perspective on the development of ﬁscal institutions in both countries. In a continental scenario, in which Latin American countries are undergoing a strong decentralisation process, it is suggested to advance in reforms that increase transparency, accountability and citizen participation. In addition, it is advisable to limit non-programmatic allocations and provide stability in the distribution of public resources.
Organisation(s): Department of Geography and Regional Research
Journal: Investigaciones Regionales
ISSN: 1695-7253
DOI: https://doi.org/10.38191/iirr-jorr.24.004
Publication date: 2024
Peer reviewed: Yes
Austrian Fields of Science 2012: 507009 Regional planning, 507016 Regional economy
Portal url: https://ucrisportal.univie.ac.at/en/publications/0ec24bfb-1ea6-4d4d-81a8-6107298fc188

Back