Clientlism and electoral competition : the case of Chile’s municipalities
- Author(s)
- Felipe Bernabé Livert Aquino
- Abstract
Patronage is often considered a subtype of clientelism that arises through reciprocal arrangements between a politician and a citizen, where electoral support is rewarded with public employment. In Chile, there is evidence of clientelist practices at the municipal level. However, these studies have mainly had a qualitative focus. To complement these studies, this research aims to provide quantitative evidence using panel data and two-way fixed effects. Thus, we analyse the personnel hiring through the Mercado Público platform between 2009 and 2017 across the country’s 345 municipalities, finding evidence that support two hypotheses: (i) there is a political budget cycle, increasing spending by 14.9% during the election year and (ii) independent politicians spend less on hiring people than mayors who are militants of political parties, being this expenditure -9.8% less for independents than for the latter. These results seek to complement other research on clientelism and patronage in a context of the rise of independent politicians and citizen questioning of traditional political parties, as well as the relevance of public spending in local governments.
- Organisation(s)
- Department of Geography and Regional Research
- Journal
- Ciencia Politica
- Volume
- 43
- Pages
- 489-521
- No. of pages
- 33
- ISSN
- 1909-230X
- DOI
- https://doi.org/10.4067/s0718-090x2023005000120
- Publication date
- 12-2023
- Peer reviewed
- Yes
- Austrian Fields of Science 2012
- 507015 Regional research, 502027 Political economy, 506014 Comparative politics
- Keywords
- ASJC Scopus subject areas
- Political Science and International Relations, Sociology and Political Science
- Portal url
- https://ucrisportal.univie.ac.at/en/publications/c9f1d9e7-98b0-4cb3-b879-f66486a3e652